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Abstract 
The evolving nature of a malicious and persistent threat is unlike traditional environmental hazards to space flight missions, such 
as radiation. Consequently, engineering mission systems to be resilient to this new generation of threats may require extending or 
modifying traditional systems engineering processes and paradigms so as to effectively address the more dynamic behavior and 
characteristics of the intelligent adversary. This paper steps through a live deployment of a common reconnaissance attack on 
mission systems that have been deemed “secure” by traditional means, e.g., via compliance to the canonical IT Security Plan. The 
observations and lessons learned from studying a live attack in a mission context enabled us to identify and map out those critical 
areas that must be addressed in future systems engineering efforts.  Particularly those that aim to build more resilient mission 
systems to the cyber adversary. In short, the simple reconnaissance demonstration presented here illustrates how a collection of 
"secure" machines can be assembled into an insecure system requiring that we explore cyber-defensive testing facilities, 
methodologies, toolsets, and how these can be linked to testing goals. 
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1. Introduction 
Nomenclature 
CDIA Cyber Defense and Information Architecture (group) 
CDRL Cyber Defense Research Lab 
EAR Export Administration Regulations 
FCR Fault Containment Region 
ITAR International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
SSO Single Sign-On 
V&V Verification and Validation 
VM Virtual Machine 
1.1. Motivation 
Space assets require protection from extremely hostile environments. Attacks from cyber-space can be shown to 
be as harmful to spacecraft, and to their ground-based data and support systems, as radiation belts and temperature 
extremes have always been. Examples of adversarial cyber activity against space assets as recorded in the open 
literature include: 
x "On July 23, 2008, Landsat-7 experienced 12 or more minutes of interference. The responsible party did not 
achieve all steps required to command the satellite."1 
x "On October 22, 2008, Terra EOS AM-1 experienced nine or more minutes of interference. The responsible party 
achieved all steps required to command the satellite but did not issue commands."1 
x "a Chinese national was detained in December 2010 by Chinese authorities for violations of Chinese 
Administrative Law. This case resulted in the first confirmed detention of a Chinese national for hacking activity 
targeting U.S. Government agencies. Seven NASA systems, many containing export-restricted technical data, 
were compromised by the Chinese national."2 
x "In June 2012, a Romanian national known as 'Tinkode' pleaded guilty in Romanian court to charges of illegally 
accessing numerous systems belonging to NASA, the Pentagon, the Romanian government, and U.S. commercial 
entities."3 
x "...the ISS recently was infected by a computer virus."4 
 
Warnings and alerts are plentiful. 
x The US Director of National Intelligence assessed "cyber" as the #1 threat to the US in 2014, and wrote in 
particular about space: "Threats to US space services will increase during 2014 and beyond as potential 
adversaries pursue disruptive and destructive counterspace capabilities. Chinese and Russian military leaders 
understand the unique information advantages afforded by space systems and are developing capabilities to 
disrupt US use of space in a conflict. For example, Chinese military writings highlight the need to interfere 
with, damage, and destroy reconnaissance, navigation, and communication satellites. China has satellite 
jamming capabilities and is pursuing antisatellite systems. In 2007, China conducted a destructive antisatellite 
test against its own satellite. Russia’s 2010 military doctrine emphasizes space defense as a vital component of 
its national defense. Russian leaders openly maintain that the Russian armed forces have antisatellite weapons 
and conduct antisatellite research. Russia has satellite jammers and is also pursuing antisatellite systems."5 
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x "The satellite control component does raise two risks that must be mitigated: (1) the potential for an adversary 
to remotely introduce a false satellite command; and (2) the potential for an adversary to prevent the satellite 
operator from transmitting commands or receive telemetry from the satellite."6 
 
Unfortunately, specific, detailed, information about particular incidents are hard to come by - details that include 
the exact commands issued by the adversary, or the state of the victim environment at the time of the attack. There is 
often more hearsay than fact available making it extremely difficult for defenders to construct a viable defense. 
Most organizations have well established processes and procedures that are designed to protect current work and 
future products from error and failure, and are based on expert experience and lessons learned. These same 
processes and procedures have sometimes been pointed to as reasonable controls for risks that they were not 
designed to protect against. The assertion that existing controls will protect against risks is sometimes accepted 
without reasonable supporting data or, even worse, is accepted where the lack of data is used as proof. 
It is important to note that as the cyber-threat environment changes, cyber defenses need to be implemented or 
adapted to keep pace. A key distinction is in the nature of cyber-attackers - they are malicious, persistent, and evolve 
their attacks over time. By contrast, radiation doesn't change the way it attacks materials after you've chosen your 
shielding. Consequently, an active and continual study of changing adversarial actions with respect to the 
operational needs of a mission is an important process that must supplement the more static failure model 
approaches currently prevalent in mission design. 
1.2. Goals 
Our aim is to examine whether applying a set of critical system engineering precepts for V&V (Verification and 
Validation) testing to a representative mission system exposes security flaws that have been missed by the 
traditional IT compliance certification processes. 
We begin by describing the critical attributes of a V&V campaign in Section 2, and we look at related efforts in 
the field of security testing in Section 3.  Section 4 describes a representative mission system that has been deemed 
“secure” by way of complying with current IT security measures.  Then we apply the V&V attributes to the system, 
providing a detailed account of a live (and successful) reconnaissance attack that we deployed against that system. 
In the subsequent sections we discuss the results of that testing, explore opportunities for future work, and end with 
our conclusions. 
2. Technical Approach 
Traditional System Engineering testing includes many concerns such as safety of systems under test, educating 
team members, etc. In the scope of this paper we focus on the following key concerns: Independent review, 
Verification, and Validation.  These are, in our opinion, the most critical key steps to support a claim that a system is 
actually secure. 
In our effort to address the evolving threat environment, our team is applying JPL's experience in autonomous 
fault protection for flight missions to detection, diagnosis, and response to cyber threats. However, in order to design 
and mount effective defenses, we must have the ability to test the controls and mitigations. Traditionally, the 
discipline of test engineering culminates in a V&V campaign: Does the system do what the system engineers 
designed it to do? Does the design actually accomplish the objective? This revised approach requires cyber defense 
focused testing prior to the traditional V&V campaign. 
2.1. Independent Review 
The subject matter experts responsible for reviewing individual pieces are biased toward seeing success; their 
testing is driven by functional requirements of what the system must accomplish.  Testing whether a system can 
intentionally be driven to unintended behavior through some weaknesses needs to come from an independent source, 
not so vested in the functional viewpoint. 
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2.2. Verification 
Cyber Defense architectures, designs, and mitigations must be evaluated in a principled and repeatable manner to 
verify they perform as intended. They must be subjected to a range of conditions that at least represent current 
understanding of the threat environment, the systems must behave in an observable fashion, and in a manner that can 
be compared across that range of conditions as designs and mitigations are refined to resist attack. When defenses 
exist in software, the verification conditions should be exactly repeatable so that tests can be re-run, generating 
consistent results, and the results comparable across verification runs. 
A verification activity must cover at least these attributes: 
x Range of conditions (not just single or "best case" points) 
x Observable behaviors 
x Comparable observations 
x Repeatable tests 
2.3. Validation 
 Cyber Defense designs must be validated in a realistic environment to show they will be effective against the 
attacks they are intended to mitigate. The validation process increases awareness and understanding of how resilient 
it is in the face of a persistent and evolving adversary. Understanding which services may fail, under what 
conditions those failures occur, and how to work through those failures are all part of the validation process. 
3. Related efforts 
Attempting to apply structured, formalized approaches to cyber security is not a new idea. McClean introduces 
"The Specification and Modeling of Computer Security"7 in 1990, following up 9 years later with a rear-view mirror 
look at his work applying formalized methods to cyber security testing.8 Our peers at JPL have continued this idea 
for software security in both development and maintenance life cycles.9 
Our colleagues at USC have achieved many advancements through the DHS/NSF sponsored DETER project, 
designed to move "beyond the classic 'testbed' model" to provide "fundamentally transformational cyber security 
research methodologies."10 SEER (Security Experimentation EnviRonment)11 and Montage12 are suites of tools that 
attempt to control each part of the life-cycle of a cyber security experiment, reducing human error. 
We have recently experimented with existing testbeds, including DETER, by using them as the platform for our 
cyber security experiments. Overall, we've found that the majority of such systems have promises of groundbreaking 
ideas on how to approach cyber security testing, but those ideas are largely unimplemented or only implemented to 
the point of proving out a concept. It is important to note that we have not worked with more restrictive access 
testbeds, such as the DHS NCR (Department of Homeland Security National Cyber Range)13, so it is unclear from a 
public perspective what may be available in this realm. 
We are currently working towards building our own CDRL (Cyber Defense Research Lab), which would begin to 
implement our proposed new testing approach, while having the capability to federate with existing testbeds.  We 
have started with steps not unlike those described by the Rapid7 Metasploit team's "Penetration Testing Lab"14. 
4. Deploying and Understanding an Attack 
A well-documented security breach tactic was repeatedly conducted as a "Reconnaissance demonstration".  This 
showed how a persistent adversary could exploit a small weakness in controls to then patiently explore a much 
wider enterprise infrastructure. 
4.1. Test Infrastructure 
We created a close approximation of a real-world mission architecture.  That architecture had undergone review 
and had passed the typical security checks, including vulnerability scans. The architecture had three distinct 
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environments: Dev, Test, and Ops (Development, Test, and Flight Operations). A corporate perimeter firewall 
enclosed all three, and there was an additional firewall/bastion-host in front of Ops (see Figure 1). 
The testbed for this experiment was a few workstations recently decommissioned from a flight project, some 
laptops, and an inexpensive 8-port ethernet hub, hosting a collection of VMs (Virtual machines).  One separate 
physical machine served as a gateway between our experiment and the corporate network allowing us to isolate the 
other machines and also monitor network traffic.  Tests could be run with confidence that we would not 
inadvertently impact the mission machines we were modeling. 
 
 
Fig. 1.Recon Roadmap 
4.2. Run Attack, Observe Consequences 
The "Reconnaissance demonstration" used several actors: an attacker, a victim, and a defender.  There were six 
phases: 
 
1. Initial breach: we posited an attacker having gained write-access to a victim's home directory, with just 1 
minute to do something. Then the attacker lost that access. Think of walking up to a victim's laptop in a coffee shop. 
Then our victim went about some normal work-day tasks: 
2. Logged in to the Dev environment using multi-factor authentication (username, password, and 1-use-token 
plus PIN). This authentication generates an SSO (Single Sign-On) ticket that allows logins to other machines 
without repeating the multi-factor process. 
3. Logged in from Dev to Test, using the SSO ticket. 
4. Logged in from Test to the Ops firewall/bastion-host. This required repeating the multi-factor authentication 
steps, as the SSO trust did not extend to the Ops environment. 
5. Logged into an Ops machine. 
6. Logged out of all machines, as if going home for the day 
 
Because of the actions taken in the initial 1-minute breach, the attacker could observe everything the victim did, 
and could also independently act on each machine the victim accessed. By the time the victim finished, the attacker 
had persistent access to all three environments. However, our defender had detected anomalous activity. 
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4.2.1. Reconnaissance Scope 
Our purpose was not to design smooth attacks, but to be resilient to them. We did not bother being stealthy; the 
attacker would have been easy for a real user to spot, if they looked. Because we knew what this victim would do in 
the scenario, the attacker did not build in conditions for other equally likely real-world scenarios. 
We ran the demonstration with notional detections and notifications. 
4.3. Initial Breach Attack Tree 
There are many well-reported real-world examples of an initial breach. Figure 2 shows a small attack tree, with 
"victim goals" in green ovals, "attacker actions" in red rectangles, and potential defenses in blue shields. We 
validated that the scenario was credible by stepping through several examples of remote exploits of (older) 
applications similar to those commonly found on mission Dev machines (web servers, databases, etc.). 
 
Fig. 2. Attack Tree 
5. Observations and Results 
5.1. Test as you fly, fly as you test 
The reconnaissance demonstration was conducted using representative systems and infrastructure supporting 
space missions. These systems and infrastructure have all passed the standard IT security checks, passed non-
intrusive vulnerability scans, and are under configuration management control. The systems and infrastructure 
security controls were left intact as part of this overall test. The intent is to test in as high fidelity like environment as 
possible so that results are transferable to the operations environment. 
What was identified by the demo was that the dependencies on underlying systems to trigger alarms was often 
misplaced due to gaps in coverage across the consolidated system. Monitoring designs from a single layer and 
perspective appeared to be complete, but when combined with other systems the completeness in coverage needed to 
be verified and validated again. It was the combined suite of capabilities that created a new risk and that risk had 
never been considered, tested, or accepted because the accepted but unverified position was that each layer of 
control was already providing the needed protection. This demonstration also led to the identification of places 
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where existing preventive measures were inadequate and that true risk to missions were never raised for 
consideration. 
5.2. Fault containment aligned with lifecycle management 
The demonstrations raised awareness that existing fault containment zones were inadequate in providing 
protections they were perceived, but not originally intended, to provide. The systems supporting missions and their 
security controls are divided along the standard systems development lifecycle lines of Development, Integration & 
Test, and Operations. The demonstration security breach exploited a weakness in a development system, which 
provided access to a single-sign-on feature that, in turn, granted access to Test and eventually Operations.  
What was identified in the testing and demonstration was that existing security controls had gaps in their 
coverage, which exposed the Test and Operations to risks originating from the Development environment. 
Unfortunately, environment controls on development are sometimes not as tightly controlled as they are in Test and 
Operations. Depending on those weaknesses in control, it just may provide an adversary the needed attack surface to 
go after and gain access to the other hardened environments as was shown in this example. 
6. Future Work 
Following JPL's experience in spaceflight V&V campaigns, we are working to instantiate a rigorous 
methodology and toolset for repeatable testing of cyber defense implementations. We are working to define metrics 
to apply in both the situational awareness domain, to compare nominal with off-nominal system behavior, and to 
testing phases, to compare pre and post-mitigated systems. 
In parallel, we are designing a specialized cyber-defense testbed. Such a testbed would not only take into account 
classic features of a cyber-security testbed including sanitization between experiments, isolation, and strong access 
control, but would provide the capability for us to realize our goals of high fidelity system capture, repeatability, and 
automated capture of real-time state for generating metrics. 
6.1. Testbed Connectivity 
We have identified needs that map to varying (mutually exclusive) levels of network connectivity: 
x Fully isolated for handling live malware 
x Tightly firewalled where we need access to one or a handful of external services we cannot replicate internally, 
like a specific authentication infrastructure. 
x Tunneled point-to-point, as with DETERlab (see below) 
x Open to corporate network 
x Open to Internet 
The techniques for providing these, and safely changing from one to another, remain to be developed.  A 
particular challenge is assuring that malware experimented with while fully isolated is truly gone before opening 
access. 
6.2. Combining with DETERlab 
We see value in combining our testbed's mission-specific assets with other testbeds' wider security expertise and 
diversity of hostile vectors. USC's DETERlab is especially promising for us. Like our CDRL, USC's DETER is 
itself an isolatable network security testbed. It lets users define networks of arbitrary topology, creating them on real 
hardware within the DETER data center. It resembles cloud infrastructure services in their elasticity of provisioning, 
but differs in delivering physical rather than virtual remote nodes by default. Apart from a user interface, DETER 
nodes are wholly isolated from the internet by both implementation and policy.  With great assistance from DETER 
personnel, we achieved a full, any-to-any access between the node populations at the DETER and JPL testbed sites 
using an open source encrypted VPN (Virtual Private Network) tunnel. 
 DJ Byrne et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  28 ( 2014 )  522 – 530 529
While most tests are not expected to require DETER's additional resources, the VPN opportunistically augments 
our capabilities by opening the possibility. Any test we devise can now incorporate DETER nodes if we wish. 
Security, in terms of data confidentiality between the sites, is implicit. Security, in terms of release of sensitive data 
from JPL to the outside, is not. DETER's hundreds of physical nodes, with our dozen physical and thousands of 
virtual ones, adds a dimension of new possibility for future testing. 
6.3. Design Defenses 
The CDRL will enable rapid-turnaround prototyping and validation (or discarding) of new and innovative 
defenses.  The early defenses we anticipate testing, once our capability is built up, are of several types. 
6.3.1. Controls 
Automated controls are the mainstream type of defense.  Our group already packages an 
authentication/authorization approach for "baking in" to JPL's Ground Data Systems; we anticipate creating new 
controls as heightened testing reveals subtler flaws. 
6.3.2. Education 
Pre-packaged testing serves double-duty as a training tool.  Users who believe their systems invulnerable need to 
learn what a persistent, evolving adversary can do.  The CDRL will be a forum for teaching hands-on cyber-defense 
exercises using "live ammo" in a safe environment.  Correcting the threat awareness of software development teams 
is the earliest injection point for enhancing system resiliency. 
6.3.3. Situational Awareness 
While there are many vendors for "Intruder Detection Systems", the products require site-specific customization 
to suit the environment in which they are used.  We expect to use the CDRL to establish tuning parameters that 
define normal behavior for a system.  Anomalous behavior may then be tied to automatic responses, which must 
themselves be studied for unintended side effects. 
7. Conclusions 
Our initial experimentation results prove that today’s systems are not prepared for yesterday’s cyber-attacks, 
despite the fact that standard security testing was performed. Applying system engineering processes in addition to 
IT compliance checks can more completely verify and validate cyber defenses. 
We observed multiple attack vectors accomplishing similar breaches in different environments. Typical controls 
failed to achieve the fault containment that many believed would be enforced as a cyber security mitigation. This 
observation underscores the need for V&V processes that can address agile threats that evolve. 
We observed unforeseen consequences of architectural decisions, where system features designed to help the user 
can end up helping the adversary. Specifically, SSO (Single Sign-On) grants access not just to the user, but also to 
everything running with that user's identity.  Awareness and education of this phenomenon highlights a need for 
application-level security, where each piece protects itself from the others - as opposed to trusting a course-grained 
perimeter firewall. 
The test infrastructure was invaluable in demonstrating architectural weaknesses.  Component interactions have 
to be replicated with good fidelity, while not exposing production resources to the attack vectors we are 
experimenting with.  
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